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Three views on utility-generated externalities
Maine Policy Review (1993). Volume 2, Number 1
"Externalities" are costs imposed on third parties without compensation. Pollution is the
archetypical externality. It is the pollution externality that has prompted the emerging national
debate over whether public utility regulation should be modified to account for externalities.
Jonathan Raab, Myrick Freeman, and Ralph Townsend discuss the arguments surrounding the
externality debate. These three authors earlier presented similar material at a Legislative
Institute, sponsored by the Margaret Chase Smith Center for Public Policy's Project for the Study
of Regulation and the Environment, for the Utilities Committee of the Maine State Legislature.

Appropriate environmental adders
by A. Myrick Freeman, III, Bowdoin College
Introduction
In an ideal world, the problem of externalities from electricity generation would be managed
comprehensively, as a component of the larger set of energy and environmental problems. But
even within the current framework of separate environmental and utility agencies, there are ways
for utility regulators to account for environmental considerations. Utilities and regulators are
concerned with the cost and reliability of energy supply, while the environmental agencies are
looking at air pollutants and water pollutants. Even if public utility regulators take as given the
federal and state environmental policies, they can and should nevertheless look at the
environmental implications of new resource acquisition. The logical approach is to use
externality "adders," where the adders are based on the marginal damages of competing sources
of supply. That damage, in fact, is part of the cost of supplying electricity.
Consider a simple example of two plants, one hydro and one coal, that are bidding to supply the
same amount of electricity to the grid. Under present rules, they would bid based on their private
costs of production. Suppose that the coal plant costs ten cents, while the hydro is more
expensive at twelve cents. But there are externality costs. And let us assume that we can measure
the externalities. Suppose that because of high air emissions, environmental costs are four cents
for coal, but they are only one cent for the hydro plant. (This might be because of impacts on
recreation, for example.) From the perspective of total social costs, the coal plant is the higher
cost alternative. To minimize the cost to society, we should pick the hydro plant. That result will
occur if the external costs are calculated and included in as adders in the planning process.
The argument for environmental adders
Public utilities commissions should be concerned with the environmental implications of the
decisions they make, even though there are other agencies that also examine environmental
effects. Using adders in the resource planning process is consistent with least-cost objectives or
resource acquisition. Some have argued that commissions should not be concerned with these
environmental issues, because the environment is the responsibility of Environmental Protection

Agency and other environmental agencies. But accounting for environmental impacts is
consistent with an expanded view of traditional regulatory objectives: that we want to protect the
economic welfare of electricity customers. To accomplish that, increments to supply must create
the lowest social cost to the society, not just the lowest private cost. Thus, when the air pollution
from a generating station leads to poor health, poor health is an important external cost of that
generation. A commission is not protecting the customer when it chooses low private costs but
high environmental costs. Although rates may be lower, the customers ultimately bear the higher
external costs.
How should a commission account for these environmental and external impacts? The only way
that is logically consistent with least-cost planning in resource acquisition is that the adder
should be based on estimates of environmental damages. Then, how can we calculate these
environmental damages? Do we know enough to do it?
Several years ago, the Public Service Commission in New York directed its utilities to study if it
would be feasible to estimate the environmental costs from different electricity sources and to
incorporate them into least cost planning. After several years of discussion among utilities and
the state agencies, a study, of which I am project director, was initiated. The study is at about its
mid-point. The utilities and the Electric Power Research Institute have contributed $1.3 million
to the project, which is being spent over a three-year period. The objective is to develop a
personal computer-based model that estimates site-specific environmental costs. If we are
successful, planners will be able to input "coal burning power plant, Central Park West,
Manhattan." Within a few minutes, it would provide results that say, in effect, "Don't put it
there!" because the external damages will be very high. The planner could then try other fuel
sources in the least-cost planning process, and the model would provide estimates of external
cost for each source.
In the New York study, we are examining all of the damages and benefits from the entire fuel
cycle. This includes the external effects of coal mining and petroleum exploration and also the
external costs associated with disposal of fly ash and other wastes. Importantly, the damages (or
benefits) are generally location specific. At present, Massachusetts, New York and some other
states apply uniform values to a particular generation source within the state. By contrast, we
will not develop a table of values, but rather we will develop a model to calculate specific
damages and benefits for each source and location. We should seek common methods for
defining and measuring the external damages, rather than common values.
Is there really enough data to estimate external costs? In the New York study, we are looking at
the literature on the health effects of air pollution, both on mortality and morbidity. This
scientific knowledge can be used to estimate the numbers of cases, the various kinds of
symptoms and illnesses, and even the excess deaths that are associated with given increases in
levels of certain air pollutants. There is also evidence on how much people are willing to pay to
avoid these effects and on the economic damages from these adverse affects. We will incorporate
that literature into the model. So, yes, I do believe that we will be able to construct meaningful
damage estimates.

We do face some formidable obstacles in the calculation of damages from carbon dioxide and
the other greenhouse gases. There is a basic lack of technical knowledge and consensus on the
natural and physical effects of the increasing concentration of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere.
However, it may not be necessary to calculate damages due to climate change. For example, a
national or international agreement to cap or to tax carbon dioxide emissions will resolve the
problems for utility planning as well. With a cap on emissions globally, any new electricity
source would have to buy carbon dioxide permits from someone else. With a cap, there would be
no net increase in emissions so marginal damages would be zero. Similarly, if there is a tax
based on estimated damages, then the social costs of carbon dioxide emissions would be built
into the private cost via the tax structure.
At present, all externality adders are calculated from the costs of abatement. This approach has
serious problems, because abatement costs are not good measures of marginal damage. New
York and California both have plans to shift from abatement cost calculations to marginal
damage calculations. I hope that this trend continues in other states, because it will result in
better decisions.
How to incorporate adders
The appropriate way to incorporate the adder depends on how environmental policies are
implemented by the environmental agencies. To be precise, the adder used by the utilities should
be based on the additional environmental damage from the new source that is not already
incorporated into the cost of production. In some situations, there will be no net addition to
environmental damage from new sources. The best example is the case of sulfur dioxide
emissions, because emissions are capped by the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990. A new
coal-burning source with sulfur dioxide emissions would have to buy emission permits from
some other source. Even though there may be an increase in sulfur emissions at the new source,
there is an offsetting decrease elsewhere. Therefore, there is no net change in environmental
damage. A similar situation arises if there is a tax on emissions that is based on the marginal
damage. Because the new source already faces the tax on emissions, the marginal damages are
already part of the private cost to the utility.
In traditional command-and-control regulations, a utility removes the level of pollutants required
by its license. It does not, however, incur any costs for the residual emissions. These residual
damages are not incorporated in private decision-making. Therefore, the appropriate adder is the
marginal damage of the unabated pollution. Thus, the adder will depend on specific details of
environmental policy. The adder approach being adopted in several states is the correct
application for pollutants subject to command-and-control regulation.
Conclusion
The use of externality adders in the least-cost planning process by public utilities is an important
first step in environmental/utility policy. Adders do not solve all the problems, because they
enter only in the choice of which new resources to acquire. The logical next step would be to
incorporate analogous adders for dispatch decisions, that is, for the choice of which plants to run

to meet current needs. And there are clearly gains from more comprehensive policies, such as
emissions taxes, so that we do not encourage by-pass of the regulated utilities.
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